This article examines the protection currently afforded in Europe to victims of armed conflict and indiscriminate violence in the context of article 15c of the EC Qualification Directive (QD) and article 3 of the ECHR. It analyses the recent case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights, and five member states (the UK, Germany, France, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands) with a view to identifying current legislation and state practice within Europe. It builds on an article by Lambert and Farrell to show how article 15c, as interpreted by the CJEU in Elgafaji, provides scope for broadening protection. It also discusses the relationship between article 3 ECHR and article 15c QD and human dignity as a core value in international protection. Finally, it considers the recent case law of European courts (both regional and national) and argues that this shows practical reasoning about the range of threats facing people fleeing conflict and violence and an awareness of a wider range of problems than previously recognized in protection cases. Nonetheless, there continues to be uncertainty regarding the threshold of indiscriminate violence required to satisfy article 15c.
Introduction: the limited reach of refugee law for victims of armed conflict and indiscriminate violence
The 1951 Refugee Convention 1 has limited reach when it comes to victims of armed conflict and indiscriminate violence because the definition of a refugee in article 1A(2) of the Convention is primarily individualistic and focuses on discriminatory acts of persecution based on specific grounds. 2 To borrow a phrase from Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, the criteria for refugee status 'have the individual asylum seeker very much in mind'. 3 The
Helene Lambert
UNHCR itself has long held the view that 'Persons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international or national armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol'. 4 Nevertheless, in 2011, the 60th anniversary year of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UNHCR recognized the need to update this position in order to bring it in line with current developments in law and practice. 5 In its study 'Safe At Last?', the UNHCR reminded us that if the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol were to be properly applied, they would address most international protection needs, including those arising in the context of armed conflict and serious public disorder. 6 The limitations of international refugee law in regard to persons fleeing armed conflict and indiscriminate violence lie in the word 'if '.
In practice, states have long afforded protection against refoulement to persons fleeing from indiscriminate violence (or more accurately the indiscriminate effects of generalized violence) who fall outside the 1951 Refugee Convention framework. Based on general humanitarian principles, they became known as de facto refugees. 7 For many years, the Council of Europe remained the main forum to tackle this issue, and for improving the situation of de facto refugees in Europe through the work of the Parliamentary Assembly and of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The European Court of Human Rights also expanded its protection role against refoulement to a country where 'substantial grounds' exist for believing that a person would face a 'real risk' of treatment contrary to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
8 Their example was soon followed by UNHCR. 9 However, it was the war in the former Yugoslavia that led to key changes in how states dealt with victims of armed conflict and indiscriminate violence.
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The war 'resulted in the largest displacement of refugees into western Europe since the Second World War'. 10 Many of the displaced did not qualify for refugee status, yet they could not be sent back because of 'compelling humanitarian reasons '. 11 'Despite overwhelming evidence of ethnically-based persecution, many Bosnians were considered to be fleeing a generalized threat of violence, and to comprise a "mixed" population of refugees and other vulnerable migrants ' . 12 Hence, a political compromise had to be found; a policy of 'temporary protection' was developed and was implemented in most European states as a way to suspend or by-pass normal asylum procedures.
It has been argued that 'state interests, rather than a broader international responsibility, have largely determined the response to Bosnians in the EU'. 13 Temporary Protection may not therefore be 'a useful benchmark against which to measure the acknowledgement of [European states] humanitarian obligations' in the post-cold war.
14 Indeed, beyond Bosnia, Temporary Protection did extend to Kosovo (albeit on a smaller scale) but that is all.
Temporary Protection therefore appears to have been a specific response arising out of specific circumstances. It has not been generally extended to asylum seekers who arrived with Bosnians, or who have arrived from other countries since. The only exceptions to this have been very specific populations arriving in France, for example, Algerians fleeing attacks by Islamic fundamentalists, or individuals from Rwanda arriving after the genocide in 1994.
On 20 July 2001, EU member states formally adopted the EC Directive on Temporary Protection; 15 the first of five key Directives to be adopted that form the EU acquis on asylum law. The Temporary Protection Directive enables the Council of Ministers of the EU to act, by qualified majority, in situations involving a mass influx of displaced people by triggering an exceptional yet immediate protection mechanism. As of today, the Directive on Temporary Protection has never been used.
Subsidiary protection, introduced in the EU by the Qualification Directive (QD) in 2004, 16 is therefore a key tool for victims of conflict and 10 K Koser and R Black, 'Limits to Harmonization: The "Temporary Protection" of Refugees in the European Union ' (1999) 18 However, due to a climate of restrictive interpretation of existing practices, the scope of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection was subsequently narrowed down, 19 casting doubt as to whether the QD would lead to more people being granted protection in the EU.
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According to the QD, article 2(e) (now article 2(f)), subsidiary protection is to be granted to 'a third country national or stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin … would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in article 15 …'. 21 'Serious harm' is defined in article 15 as: (a) death penalty or execution; (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or, (c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.
Looking more closely at article 15c, 'serious harm' in this context is defined in terms of 'threat'. The 'threat' in question must be 'serious and individual' in nature, it must focus on a 'civilian's life or person', and it must be caused by 'indiscriminate violence' in circumstances 'arising in situations of armed conflict'.
This article examines the protection currently afforded in Europe to victims of conflict and violence in the context of article 15c QD as applied by decision makers. It analyses recent case law from the Court of Justice
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of the European Union (CJEU) and from five member states with a view to identifying current legislation and state practice. The UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands have been selected as case studies because each has well-developed case law on article 15c. The Czech Republic appears to be developing embryonic case law on article 15c and this case study is added as a comparison. In the case of the UK, Germany and France, discussions with senior decision makers were also held during the last three years to broaden an understanding of the cases and legal reasoning. This article builds on an article by Lambert and Farrell to show how article 15c, as interpreted by the CJEU in Elgafaji, 22 provides scope for broadening protection. It also discusses the relationship between article 3 ECHR and article 15c QD.
This article is not arguing that victims of conflict and violence seeking protection in Europe should be considered for subsidiary protection under article 15c QD instead of refugee protection under article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, since the latter has and should continue to have primacy over the former. 23 Rather, it tackles a true reality: in the many cases where victims of conflict and indiscriminate violence find themselves falling outside the scope of article 1A(2), the automatic default option is that offered by article 15c, at least in the twenty-six EU member states that have implemented article 15c. 24 It matters greatly how the EU member states and the CJEU interpret legal provisions relating to the protection of victims of conflict and violence, not least because of recent evidence of the emulation of European refugee law and practice in countries around the world. 25 Whereas in Europe, the ECHR offers very real added protection to victims of conflict and violence who meet neither the requirement of the refugee definition (article 1A(2) Refugee Convention) nor of article 15c QD, this is not the case in other regions.
The article is divided into a further four parts. Part 2 starts by asking the question: Is there room for broadening protection under article 15c QD and, if so, where? Part 3 considers current strategies for providing protection to victims of conflict and violence based on existing courts' and Helene Lambert tribunals' decisions in five EU member states. This case law shows both similarities and differences in the assessment of indiscriminate violence and the nature of an armed conflict. Having examined the position of the Luxembourg Court and its application by domestic courts in parts 2 and 3, part 4 examines the view of Strasbourg on article 3 ECHR protection and its linkage with article 15c protection. Finally, the article concludes by arguing that current thinking on conflict, based on an expanding understanding of violence and security, finds some representation in the British, French and Dutch case law (less so perhaps in that of the German courts, and it is too early to say in the case of the Czech Republic). This current thinking is also reflected in the recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights relating to article 3 ECHR. The Court first ruled that article 15c has something more to offer than article 15b (which in essence corresponds to article 3 ECHR) or article 15a (on death penalty or execution): 'Article 15c is an autonomous concept whose interpretation must be carried out independently and without prejudice to fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR'. 29 Secondly, the Court ruled that the harm defined in article 15c, namely a serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person, 'covers a more general risk of harm' than the harm defined in article 15b, for instance, which refers to more specific acts of violence, namely torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in
the country of origin. 30 Finally, the Court sought to explain the link between 'individual threat' and 'indiscriminate violence'. 'Individual', the ECJ held, must be understood as covering harm to civilians irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterizing the armed conflict taking place, as assessed by the competent national authorities, 'reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to the serious threat referred in Article 15(c) of the Directive'. 31 The Court nonetheless recognized 'the exceptional nature of that situation' (emphasis added).
32 That said, the Court linked 'individual threat' and 'indiscriminate violence' together with regard to the standard of proof. The Court ruled that 'the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection'. 33 It follows that 'the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances'. 34 Finally, in the individual assessment of an application for subsidiary protection, account may be taken of 'the geographical scope of the situation of indiscriminate violence and the actual destination of the applicant in the event that he is returned to the relevant country' and of any past persecution or serious harm or direct threats of such persecution or harm.
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In sum, the interpretation of the word 'individual' in article 15c by the ECJ means that there is no need for the applicant to demonstrate that s/ he is individually or 'specifically' targeted in order to enjoy the protection of article 15c. 36 Rather, the importance of article 15c as interpreted by the 30 Elgafaji, ibid, paras 32-4. 31 ibid, paras 35 and 43. 32 ibid, paras 37-8. 33 ibid, para 39. 34 ibid, para 43. This is in stark contrast with some domestic courts' restrictive interpretation of art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention, according to which persons fleeing armed conflicts or civil wars or situations of generalized violence must demonstrate that they are specifically targeted or differentially at risk. 
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ECJ is its ability to provide protection from serious risks, which are situational rather than individual. 37 Yet, not every armed conflict or violent situation will attract the protection of article 15c; only those where the degree or level of violence is sufficiently high for any civilians to face a real risk to their life or personal safety simply by being there (the 'exceptional situation'). The ECJ made it clear in this case that the key element in article 15c is the degree or level of indiscriminate violence characterizing the armed conflict -it is not the existence in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) of an armed conflict. 38 Crucially, the ECJ failed to clarify what this level should be, instead, leaving it to the discretion of the national judge to assess 'the turning point at which indiscriminate violence becomes an exceptional situation'. 39 This suggests there is room for broadening (or narrowing) the scope of protection under article 15c. It also raises two key issues of procedure: how to assess conflict severity and the seriousness of risks to individuals.
Going 
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Protection, which lists armed conflicts as just one example of indiscriminate violence posing a threat to 'life, security or liberty'. 41 It can also be contrasted with the EC Temporary Protection Directive which protects: (a) persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence; and, (b) persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalized violations of their human rights. 42 The scope of article 15c QD is therefore narrower than the practice of states enshrined in Recommendation 18 and in the Temporary Protection Directive.
This part has argued that the Elgafaji ruling creates room for broadening protection under article 15c. Part 3 evaluates the extent to which the domestic courts in the five EU case study states have followed this lead.
3. Current strategies to provide protection to victims of conflict and violence: the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands compared Since the ECJ gave its ruling in the Elgafaji case, the domestic courts have grappled with the question: when does indiscriminate violence reach such a 'high level' that the article 15c requirement is met solely by a civilian being present in that territory? In doing so, national courts have vacillated between the character of armed conflict and the related concept of 'indiscriminate violence' and the nature of armed conflict in IHL. In a previous article, four metrics for assessing conflict severity and the resulting violence were examined: battle deaths, civilian casualties, population displacements, and state failure. 43 Asylum courts have generally referred to battle deaths and civilian casualties as traditional measures. The changing character of war, with the blurring of military and civilian actors and spaces, implies that civilian casualties will be a more significant element than battle deaths in measuring war severity. Yet, the last two elements are equally important in a 'new wars' context: population displacement and state failure. 44 Indeed, these seem more appropriate metrics as a guide for 41 ibid, 77. 42 ibid. 43 Lambert and Farrell, above n 22, at 256-66. See also, ICRC, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts', Paper 31IC/11/5.1.2, Oct 2011, 7-8, referring to the following factors for assessing violence in the context of common art 3: 'the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military equipment used, the number and calibre of munitions fired, the number of persons and types of forces partaking in the fighting, the number of casualties, the extent of material destruction, and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones' (emphasis added). Helene Lambert applying article 15c than the traditional ones, given that the interpretation of article 15c is to be driven by objectives in the Preamble, such as, Recital 16 Directive 2011/95/EU, which stresses human dignity (also a fundamental Charter right -article 1). 45 Furthermore, 'Human dignity is one of the core values underpinning the Refugee Convention and international protection'. 46 These two metrics are particularly relevant to this article in that they draw attention precisely to the need to engage in practical reasoning about the range of threats faced by victims of indiscriminate violence and conflict as victims of violations of human dignity.
Testing the threshold of 'indiscriminate violence' in the United Kingdom
The QD has been incorporated in the UK by the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations SI 2006/2525 and the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, Cm6918.
The UK Immigration Rules, paragraph 339C, provide a slightly different wording of 'serious harm' compared to article 15: (i) the death penalty or execution; (ii) unlawful killing; (iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of return; or (iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.
According to the original Asylum Policy Instruction (API) on 'Humanitarian Protection' (which is 'Subsidiary Protection' in the UK), article 15c was described as a 'narrow category' and humanitarian protection as only likely to be granted on this basis in exceptional circumstances. 47 However, a new API -three pages long -was released in September 2010 specifically dealing with article 15c, suggesting that this ground is growing in application and therefore in interest amongst case workers and courts.
According to this API, a Border Agency case worker dealing with an asylum applicant must first consider whether the applicant qualifies for refugee status. If the applicant does not, consideration must be given to whether s/ he qualifies for humanitarian protection (first on ECHR grounds, namely, death penalty, execution, and torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and second on the ground of indiscriminate violence). If s/ he does not, consideration must last be given to whether s/he qualifies for discretionary leave. The test comprises several elements (based on the case law discussed below). The test applies only to civilians, who 'must be genuine non-combatants'. 'The reference to a "material part" is a reference to the applicant's home area or, if appropriate, any potential place of internal relocation' (therefore the normal rules on internal relocation should be applied). There must be 'a serious threat of real harm' (fear alone is not sufficient to fall within this test). With regard to the life or person element, and for the purpose of the test, 'the level of harm that must be demonstrated may be considered to be equivalent to the level of harm that would be necessary to establish a breach of article 3 ECHR [therefore degrading treatment or punishment as a minimum threshold], although the type of harm may be different'. Armed conflict has an autonomous meaning broad enough to cover any situation of indiscriminate violence, whether caused by one or more factions or by a state, so long as the threshold of violence is met. The focus is on the level of violence that characterizes the armed conflict (not on the nature of the conflict). Indiscriminate violence is considered to be 'the converse of consistency; it carries the risk of random death or injury' (for example, a car bombing in a market place, or snipers firing at people in the street). It is envisaged that indirect consequences of indiscriminate violence (for example, criminal violence/activities or food shortage) could come within the scope of indiscriminate violence, provided they are 'an effective cause', that is, they are more closely connected than remotely. In addition, any such indirect consequences would still need to meet the threshold of the level of violence (and not all criminal activities would meet that threshold). Finally, the test just described may also be applied on a sliding scale for 'enhanced risk categories' of individuals. Thus, the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by factors particular to his personal circumstances (for example, age, disability, gender, ethnicity or by virtue of being a perceived collaborator, teacher or government official), the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible. In applying the test on a sliding scale, the caseworker may in fact decide to grant refugee status rather than humanitarian protection (that is, subsidiary protection). 
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Looking more explicitly at the case law, the Court of Appeal in QD and AH (Iraq) 52 clarified the following five points. One, IHL does not apply to the meaning of serious harm in article 15c, accordingly 'situations of international or internal armed conflict' has an autonomous meaning 53 -this is because of the differences in the object and purpose of international refugee law and IHL. Two, article 15c is concerned with 'serious threats of real harm', however, there is no requirement that there be any 'consistent pattern' of mistreatment since '[t]he risk of random injury or death which indiscriminate violence carries is the converse of consistency'. 54 Three, for the purpose of article 15c, it is possible to have an armed conflict in one area of a country, when other parts of the country are free of it, and, even in an area of internal armed conflict, there may be parts within that area where the high levels of indiscriminate violence needed to obtain protection are not achieved. 55 Four, it does not matter whether the source of the violence is two or more warring factions or a single entity or faction. 56 Five, in cases of armed conflict, the key, determining element should be the intensity of indiscriminate violence -which is not the same thing as the requirement that the armed conflict be exceptional. Such intensity may be evidenced by a worsening of the security situation or a deterioration of the humanitarian situation as characterized by mass displacement.
Following QD and AH (Iraq), the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (as it was then called) considered the case of GS Afghanistan, 57 and held that the difference between discriminate and indiscriminate violence is an issue of fact to be considered on a case by case basis. 58 It explained that, in principle, there is no reason why criminal acts should not be included in the scope of indiscriminate violence, and, subject to there being a sufficient causal link between the threat to life or person and the indiscriminate violence, there is no need for the indiscriminate violence to be caused by one or more armed factions or by the state. 59 Whether indirect consequences of indiscriminate violence can be sufficient to bring a person within article 15c will be a question of fact in each case. 60 In this case, the AIT, with reference to Preamble 26 of the QD, considered that food supply problems in Afghanistan generally were too remote from the indiscriminate violence to be causally linked, but that arguably if a village population had to flee, owing to indiscriminate bombing, to an area 52 QD and AH (Iraq), above n 37. 53 
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where they could not access food, there could be a sufficient causal nexus between the harm and the indiscriminate violence, bringing the person within the scope of article 15c. 61 The Court of Appeal dealt again with article 15c, and specifically danger arising from generalized or indiscriminate violence, in HH (Somalia).
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It applied the ECJ ruling in Elgafaji to the extent that article 15c protection is not to be equated to article 3 ECHR protection and that it is not necessary for an applicant 'to demonstrate "differentiation" between her situation and that of the population at large'. 63 It explained that the expression 'a sufficient differentiator' or 'differentiation' is too 'redolent of the language used in the refugees and article 3 ECHR cases where the applicant must show personalized or targeted risk factors' 64 and thus may not be appropriate in article 15c cases. 65 Yet, the Court of Appeal recognized that when examining the increased risk of indiscriminate violence, which follows from being a woman, 'it may still be said that the process is one of "differentiation"'. Henceforth, the expression may not be appropriate but it does not invalidate the tribunal's reasoning. The UK Court of Appeal also considered the issue of justiciability of the route of return and held that 'where the route and manner of return are known or can be implied, the first tier tribunal must consider whether the applicant would be put at risk if returned by that route'. 66 It further held obiter dicta that 'the tribunal must always consider that question whenever the applicant puts it in issue'. 67 Finally, in its latest Country Guidance, HM and Others (Iraq), 68 the Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber (as it is now called) decided the following eight points. One, seeking to distinguish between a real risk of targeted and incidental killing of civilians during armed conflict (as in GS Afghanistan) is not a helpful exercise in the context of article 15c 61 ibid, paras 69-70. Note that this scenario was recently the subject of a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of art 3 ECHR. In Sufi and Elmi, above n 36, the European Court of Human Rights found the living conditions in the main refugee camps in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya to be so dire that for the UK to return a person to these camps (indirectly, by application of the internal flight alternative) would breach art 3 ECHR (see, part 4 below). On the issue of responsibility sharing between the host state and the UNHCR for the treatment of refugees and IDPs in camps, see, G Verdirame, The UN nor does it reflect the purposes of the Directive. 69 Two, a non-inclusive approach to the assessment of violence must be regarded as flawed; civilians can be adversely affected by violence whatever its source, for instance, there can be a significant overlap between criminal and military violence. 70 Three, the term 'life or person' must extend to significant physical injuries, serious mental traumas and serious threats to bodily integrity. 71 Four, it agreed with GS Afghanistan (following AM and AM (Somalia)) 72 that the nexus between the generalized armed conflict and the indiscriminate violence posing a real risk to life and person is met when the intensity of the conflict involves means of combat (whether permissible under IHL or not) that seriously endanger non-combatants as well as resulting in such a general breakdown of law and order as to permit anarchy and criminality occasioning the serious harm referred to in the Directive. Such violence is indiscriminate in effect even if not necessarily in aim; endorsing the finding of the French Conseil d'Etat in Baskarathas that it is not necessary for the threat to life or person to derive from protagonists in the armed conflict in question: it can simply be a product of the breakdown of law and order. 73 Five, a clear prediction of when a particular individual will become the victim of indiscriminate harm is not required; all that is necessary is that there are substantial grounds for considering that there exists a serious threat of real harm, which is equivalent to assessing whether the scale of the harm is substantial because of the intensity of the conflict as it is waged at the relevant time. 74 Six, the starting point of article 15c is indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict; 75 armed conflict and indiscriminate violence are not terms of art governed by IHL, but are terms generously applied according to the objects and purpose of the Directive to extend protection as a matter of obligation in cases where it had been extended to those seeking to avoid war conflict zones as a matter of humanitarian practice. 76 Seven, the rules of IHL may nonetheless be of assistance as to when violence goes beyond casual criminality and becomes armed conflict. 77 Eight, population displacement and state failure may be factored into the overall assessment of the intensity of a conflict, in addition to battlefield death and civilian casualties, provided there is a sufficient, although not necessarily exclusive, causal nexus between the violence arising from the conflict and the harm suffered, for example, exposure to criminal violence, or destruction of the necessary means of living.
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It may be recalled that the UK incorporated a slightly different version of article 15 by providing humanitarian protection (that is, subsidiary protection) to anyone who can show a real risk of 'unlawful killing' if returned to their country of origin (Immigration Rules 339C). This has been described as 'an example of the UK retaining, rather than introducing, a more favourable standard for determining who qualifies as a person eligible for subsidiary protection' based on 'pre-Directive UK' practice of granting humanitarian protection. 79 Protection against 'unlawful killing' refers to protection from a real risk of targeted deprivation of life in breach of article 2 ECHR; it excludes 'the deprivation of life resulting from the use of force which is more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence …'. 80 As noted by Symes and Jorro, 'Interestingly … a person is eligible for humanitarian protection under this heading of serious harm if at real risk of being killed if returned to a war or conflict zone'. 81 Hence, there is a clear overlap between 'unlawful killing' and 'threats' for reason of 'indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict' as grounds for humanitarian protection (or subsidiary protection) in the UK.
Testing the threshold of 'indiscriminate violence' in Germany
The Federal Administrative Court of Germany recently confirmed its previously held view that in examining whether an internal armed conflict exists, within the meaning of article 15c, as transposed in German law, IHL shall be taken into account on the ground that Recitals 11 and 25 of the Preamble to the QD refer to international law when interpreting provisions of the Directive. 82 The Federal Court explained that it 'adheres to this approach even in light of the judgment issued in the meantime by the European Court of Justice' in Case C-465/07 (Elgafaji) . 83 It also took note of the position of the UK courts vis à vis article 15c, namely, the UKCA judgment in QD and AH (Iraq).
Helene Lambert
The Federal Court then proceeded to qualify its adoption of the requirements of article 1 Protocol II as 'by no means … unconditional', referring to International Criminal Law as equally relevant in the interpretation of the concept of an internal armed conflict. 85 It recognized that a reading of article 15c through the lens of IHL would mean that, 'at the lower end of the scale', cases of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, cannot be considered as internal armed conflict (article 1(2) Protocol II). 86 However, 'at the other end of the scale', such a conflict would most definitely exist if the criteria of article 1(2) Protocol II were satisfied (namely, a conflict between a state's armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that, under responsible command, exercise control over a part of the territory enabling them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations).
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According to the Federal Court, conflicts falling between these two ends of the scale are not automatically excluded from the scope of article 15c of the Directive, such as, for example, civil-war disputes and guerilla warfare. However, in such cases, the conflict must demonstrate a certain degree of intensity and constancy. Thus, the requirements of IHL (for example, that the parties be organized, effective control, etc.) do not necessarily have to be met. It may suffice 'if the parties to the conflict are able to carry out sustained and concerted acts of combat of such intensity and constancy that the civilian population is thereby typically also caused to suffer significantly'. 88 The existence of one of these characteristics may nonetheless be a significant indicator of the intensity and constancy of the conflict.
In this context, the Federal Administrative Court made a point of referring to the recent British case law on this subject that allows for the different objectives of IHL and international protection under the QD to be preserved without making IHL entirely superfluous. 89 Hence the Federal Court found the fact that the lower court (Higher Administrative Court) had made no explicit findings as to the degree of organization of the Taliban not to have an adverse effect; 'the established military strength and "successes" of the Taliban in parts of Afghanistan' raised 'no doubt of the existence of a sufficiently intense and sustained armed conflict'. 90 85 ibid, para 23. 86 Rutinwa has argued that since forced displacement of individuals/population is a serious crime under ICL and IHL, no doubt amounting to persecution, anyone fleeing an armed conflict should be granted refugee protection under art 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. This reasoning can be extending to art 15c protection since such crimes would also constitute 'serious harm' under art 15. B Rutinwa, 'Refugee Claims Based on Violation of International Humanitarian Law: The "Victim's" Perspective ' (2000-2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 497-517. 87 BVerwG 10 C 4.09, above n 82, para 23. 88 ibid. 89 ibid, para 24. 90 ibid, para 25.
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However, the Federal Court found a lack of sufficient proof that upon his return to Afghanistan the applicant would be subject, as a civilian, to a serious individual threat to his life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence. Following Elgafaji, if personal circumstances increasing risk are present, a lower level of indiscriminate violence will suffice. These factors that increase risk include mainly those personal circumstances that make the applicant appear more severely affected by general, non-selective violence, for example, a person who is forced by reason of his profession (for example, a physician or a journalist) to spend time near the source of danger. However, they also include (according to the Federal Administrative Court) personal circumstances by reason of which the applicant, as a civilian, is also subject to the danger of selective acts of violence (for example, religious or ethnic affiliation) if s/he is not already recognized for refugee status on these grounds.
In a statement that appears to contradict Elgafaji, the Federal Court then held: 'even in the case of personal circumstances that increase danger, a high level of indiscriminate violence or a high density of danger to the civilian population must be found in the region in question'. 91 Such a level of violence may be evidenced by quantitative determination, such as the number of civilians living in the area concerned, the number of acts of indiscriminate violence committed by the parties to the conflict against the life or person of civilians in the region, and the number of victims and the severity of casualties (death and injuries) among the civilian population. However, a limitation to the acts of violence that violate IHL (meaning that unforeseeable collateral damage, for example, would not count among such acts) cannot be deduced from article 15c;
93 'other acts of violence' (which implicitly would include criminal activities) may also be relevant.
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It is nonetheless clear from a previous judgment that the minimum threshold for the severity of indiscriminate violence is not met in cases of threats deriving from the destruction of the necessary means of survival, even if due to an armed conflict, 95 even though consideration of access to minimum livelihood are relevant in the context of an internal flight alternative.
96
The Federal Court therefore sent the case back to the lower court for a full finding of the level of indiscriminate violence or density of danger required, which was found to be missing in the appealed decision. 
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The Federal Administrative Court returned to this issue concerning evidence of the level (or 'density') of violence in a case on Afghanistan. 97 In this case, the Court explicitly stated in its reasoning that it is not sufficient to determine quantitatively the number of victims in the conflict. An assessment under article 15c requires an overview evaluation of the situation. Such an 'evaluating overview' should not only include the number of victims, but also the severity of harm caused by factors such as the condition of the health system and access to medical care. Thus, a quantitative determination of the number of victims in the conflict remains the starting point for measuring the level of violence, but this is to be followed by a qualitative determination. This qualitative assessment seeks to assess the extent to which the harm caused to the victims is increased by the lack of access to medical care and by the lack of a functioning health system. According to the decisions of the Cour Nationale du Droit d'Asile (CNDA), 'generalized violence' constitutes a necessary, defining element of internal armed conflict; it characterizes it. 'Generalized violence' is used to indicate the existence of an armed conflict of a sufficient level of intensity to meet the Elgafaji threshold. 100 Other elements, such as forced displacement and other violations of IHL against civilians, and/or the organization of a Helene Lambert in Baskarathas. 106 In the Baskarathas case, the Conseil d'Etat also recognized forced displacement as constituting evidence of generalized violence.
As a final remark, persons fleeing armed conflict and seeking refuge in France are often granted refugee status based on the Refugee Convention.
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This practice reflects the fact that many armed conflicts are based on ethnic or religious grounds, and that it is not always easy to show 'individual' threat under article 15c without having recourse to a Refugee Convention ground.
108 Subsidiary protection has nonetheless been recognized for persons fleeing armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Colombia and Sudan, but only in atypical cases (that is, where people were victims of cross-fire or looting). The figures attest to this: the first instance decisions by outcome (2011) clearly show a preference for refugee status (3,340) over subsidiary protection (1,275) ; the same is true in final decisions (4,930 were granted refugee status; 1,195 were granted subsidiary protection). 110 The applicant claimed to fear retaliation by the Kurdish community after the fall of Saddam Hussein because his brother had collaborated with Saddam's regime. His application for subsidiary protection was rejected on the ground of lack of credibility. The SAC described the test used in cases involving article 15c as a three-step test to be carried out in the following order: (1) whether the country of origin is in a situation of 'international or internal armed conflict'; (2) whether the person concerned is a 'civilian'; and (3) whether there is a 'serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence'.
(1) To meet the requirements of 15c: 'Internal armed conflict' should be defined by reference to IHL, in particular, it should fall within the scope of article 1(1) but outside the scope of article 1(2), Additional Protocol II of 1977; a conflict should satisfy the Tadić test (protracted armed violence and organization of armed groups) as elaborated by the ICTY.
111 (2) The term 'civilian' must also be defined by reference to IHL, particularly article 50 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. (3) Finally, the expression 'serious and individual threat
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to a life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence' contains several elements to be read together. The ECJ judgment in Elgafaji suggests two alternative scenarios: (a) 'total conflict' in the country of origin: every civilian 'would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to threat to his life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence'; 112 (b) the armed conflict does not reach the 'total conflict' threshold: the applicant must show further distinguishing features.
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In sum, the approach of the SAC, so far, seems to incline towards establishing the existence (or nature) of an armed conflict in IHL, as well as distinguishing between 'total' conflict and conflict that is less severe. Both the concept of 'indiscriminate violence' and that of severity (or intensity) have yet to be tested fully. Following this decision, district courts have considered that in such cases the situation across Central and Southern Somalia should be considered as the geographical area. Furthermore, when measuring the severity of indiscriminate violence, not only civilian deaths and casualty figures should be considered, but also the number of IDPs, many of whom will experience serious food and water shortages, as well as lack of protection and impunity, which often signal state failure, and can result in the targeting of displaced women and girls by gangs; and arbitrary detention. These indicators were confirmed by the Council of State in a decision of 9 April 2010. 
Comparative analysis
The analysis above indicates some consistency between the approaches of the highest courts of the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands Helene Lambert to the interpretation of article 15c; a meaningful dialogue between these courts has begun, leading to an exchange of case law and cross citations.
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This dialogue is resulting in greater similarity in approaches to article 15c for victims of conflict and violence. Following the lead of the ECJ's ruling in Elgafaji, recent decisions from the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands show a determination to test the threshold of 'indiscriminate violence' characterizing an armed conflict under article 15c. The existence in IHL of an armed conflict is not determinant 117 -rather, armed conflict is said to have an autonomous meaning in EU law (that focuses less on the parties involved in the conflict and more on the intensity of violence). The Czech Republic stands out as an exception, since, so far, the Supreme Court appears to have concentrated almost exclusively on the classification of an armed conflict in IHL (including a certain level of organization for the parties involved), less so on assessing its determinant threats to civilians.
In assessing or measuring the intensity of a conflict or the level of violence, UKUT has expressly endorsed looking at battlefield deaths, civilian casualties, forced displacement and state failure. Both France and the Netherlands also recognize forced displacement and the breakdown of law and order as important indicators of the existence of threats to life or person. Hence, France, the UK and the Netherlands explicitly recognize serious criminal acts/activities (indirect consequences of an armed conflict) to be relevant indicators when measuring the intensity of indiscriminate violence. Food supply problems (indirect consequences of an armed conflict) are also relevant to the Dutch courts, and may also be covered by article 15c in exceptional situations in the UK, as decided by UKUT. Germany requires first and foremost quantitative determination, such as the number of civilians living in the area concerned, the number of acts of indiscriminate violence committed by the parties to the conflict against the life or person of civilians in the region, and the number of victims and severity of casualties (deaths and injuries) among the civilian population. Germany also recognizes 'other acts of violence' (such as criminal activities, as well as, in principle, the denial of access to medical care, but not the lack of food supply) as additional elements.
What about Strasbourg?
The domestic courts and the Luxembourg Court (ECJ/CJEU) are not the only courts to have considered claims from victims of indiscriminate 117 For an argument to the contrary, see H Storey, Armed Conflict in Asylum Law, above n 4. The relevance of IHL to interpreting art 15c is now the subject of a preliminary ruling pending at the CJEU (Aboubacar Diakite, above n 38).
Helene Lambert article 15 QD. A year before the CJEU gave its ruling in the Elgafaji case, the European Court of Human Rights, not too surprisingly, considered the issue to fall outside the scope of its examination.
On the substance, the Strasbourg Court accepted the argument that a general situation of violence in a country of destination [may] be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there was a real risk of illtreatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return.
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Although such a situation did not exist in Sri Lanka at the time, the Court did not exclude the possibility that such a situation could arise in future cases. Three years later, this finding of principle enabled the European Court of Human Rights to recognize, in Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, that article 3 ECHR offers 'comparable protection' to that afforded under article 15c QD. The Court noted, in particular, that 'the threshold set by both provisions may, in exceptional circumstances, be attained in consequence of a situation of general violence of such intensity that any person being returned to the region in question would be at risk simply on account of their presence there'. 127 It found the situation of general violence in Mogadishu to be sufficiently intense to conclude that (almost) anyone returned there would be at real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR. To assess this level of violence, it relied on the criteria identified by the UK AIT in AM and AM (Somalia), 128 namely, methods and tactics of warfare and the number of civilians killed, injured and displaced.
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The Court then went on to consider the human rights conditions in other parts of Somalia, and whether the applicants could be returned safely to another such part (internal relocation or internal flight alternative). Quite astonishingly, it found the living conditions in the main refugee camps in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya to be so dire that for the UK to return a person to these camps would also breach article 3 ECHR on account of the human rights situation.
In order to reach its decision, the Court drew a distinction between: dire humanitarian situations, which are attributable to poverty or to a lack of resources to deal with natural phenomena such as drought; and a 126 ibid, para 115. This paragraph, particularly the language used (eg, 'sufficient level of intensity' and 'extreme'), is redolent of the language used by the ECJ on the interpretation of art 15c, in Elgafaji, above n 22 (eg, 'high level' of violence and 'exceptionally').
127 Sufi and Elmi, above n 36, para 226. 128 AM and AM (Somalia), above n 72. 129 ibid, para 241.
